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References 20I. Introduction
Since the beginning of the eighties there has been an upsurge in
the empirical analysis of the political economy of trade restric-
tions in industrialized and developing countries. These studies,
which have been surveyed by Anderson and Baldwin (1981) and
Amelung (1989) attempted to explain the structure of protection
and changes therein by establishing a causal relationship between
government intervention and characteristics of firms and indus-
tries in order to derive the determinants of government behaviour
with respect to the implementation of trade barriers. It has been
shown, that those sectors in a position to form effective
pressure groups were more successful in obtaining effective pro-
tection.
The ultimate aim of these studies was to develop further insights
into the government's decision making process with respect to
trade liberalization policies and structural adjustment programs.
The key issue in designing a sustainable structural adjustment
program concerns the appropriate trade-off between reducing the
intensity of income redistribution effects and maintaining the
efficiency of the adjustment process (Mussa (1986)).
However, the reduction and lifting of trade barriers comprises
only one part of an economic liberalization program. In many
countries regulations in the foreign trade regime are accompanied
by regulations of the financial sector, i.e. fixing of lending
and deposit rates, special government guarantees, preferential
exchange rates and foreign exchange allocation for foreign loans,
subsidized loans, quotas for credit allocation of financial in-
termediaries etc. These measures of "financial protection" which
are not trade restrictions in the narrow sense, may also benefit
particular economic sectors organized in politically influential
interest groups.- 2 -
This paper attempts to explain the structure of financial protec-
tion as it has been done earlier in studies explaining the
determinants of effective protection. The focus will be on the
question whether economic sectors benefitting from high trade
protection are also highly protected through financial regula-
tions. In the second section it will be discussed how the degree
of financial protection can be measured. Given the lack of data
and theoretical concepts, financial protection will be measured
in terms of credit allocation across industries. Since credit
allocation differs across sectors even when capital markets are
undistorted, section three will derive the economic determinants
of credit allocation. Finally, in section four, the causal rela-
tionship between cross-sector credit allocation and various
characteristics of the respective economic sectors will be
analysed empirically in order to derive the degree of distortion
in favour of specific sectors.
For an early study on this subject cf. Kane (1984).- 3 -
II. Measuring the Degree of "Financial Protection"
Before analysing the political and economic factors underlying
the government's decisions on financial regulation and protec-
tion, one has to derive a variable measuring the outcome of such
a decision making process.
In the empirical analysis of the political economy of trade poli-
cy one indicator - the effective rate of protection - is widely
accepted as a measure for the government-induced distortions in
each industry's position in international trade. In the case of
financial markets analysis, the construction of such a variable
is more difficult.
Basically, it should be possible to integrate the degree of
financial subsidization into the concept of effective protec-
tion . The "underlying idea is that individuals engaging in the
rent-seeking process view the supply of loans and other financial
means as one of many input factors affecting their production
costs.
The calculation of the effective rate of protection is based on
information about sectoral input-output structure and indicators
for the "direct" distortions of output prices in each industry,
while distortions are measured in terms of deviations from world
market prices. Corporate finance may be regarded as a service,
the value of which is given by total interest payments. Hence,
the protection indicator could be extended easily by adding
another input-producing sector that provides financial services
for all other industries and requires total national financial
wealth as input factors.
But this conflicts with the treatment of financial services with-
See Hiemenz/von Rabenau (1973), p. 107.- 4 -
in the framework of the "System of National Accounts (SNA)" .
Accordingly, the financial sector produces intermediation servi-
ces, the price of which is only a fraction of total interest
payments, namely roughly the difference between credit rates and
average deposit rates. The remaining bigger part of interest
payments ("pure interest rate") of the industrial sectors is
regarded as a part of value added of the respective sector, which
is distributed as a factor income, similar to dividend payments
and salaries. The method sketched above would lead to significant
lower value added in each industrial sector and dramatically
higher value added in the financial sector, which disqualifies
this approach.
These considerations lead to a slightly modified method for a
comprehensive protection indicator: If the prices for financial
intermediation are distorted, for example by subsidizing the
financial sector with cheap central bank refunding or tax exemp-
tions, this should indeed be integrated as a protection of the
financial sector. But if the "pure interest rate" or the credit
allocation are distorted, for example by artificially lowered
lending rates or quotas for credit allocation to the industrial
sectors, this should be integrated as a subsidy-equivalent
affecting protection of the respective sector, similar to any
2
production-subsidy . The crucial issue in this approach is the
splitting of interest payments into intermediation costs and pure
interest. In addition, these concepts seem to neglect all govern-
Cf. UN-Statistical Office (1986), pp. 72-74; for an overview of
recent proposals for an SNA-review with respect to the treat-
ment of the financial sector see G. Kopsch (1987).
2
One may consider another method, that integrates investment
goods into the protection measure; financial market distortion
would enter via "user costs of capital", which includes prices
for investment goods, "economic depreciation" and costs of
finance. But this does not allow for separating the protection
via capital goods from protection via preferential finance
conditions.- 5 -
ment interventions affecting the savings behaviour, i.e. the
total supply of loanable funds.
Apart from that, it is necessary to determine an undistorted
situation serving as a point of reference and as a basis for the
measurement of distortions. Following the concept of trade pro-
tection indicators, one could take world market prices for finan-
cial services as an undistorted reference point. However, there
are strong arguments against this approach. Interest rates (in
nominal and in real terms) vary widely among countries. Even
under strong assumptions (absence of barriers to entry, capital
transfer controls and of arbitrage costs) interest rate parity
must not hold because of country specific risk premiums due for
currency depreciation risk, corporate default risk, inflation
risk etc. Since this risk premium is not directly observable,
interest rate differences cannot be regarded as government-
induced market distortions. As an alternative concept, the
structure of financial sources of the corporate sector in an
undistorted country can be taken as a reference point. This
approach can be challenged, because the impact of differences in
legal accounting framework and in the characteristics of finan-
cial institutions cannot be quantified.
Moreover, the construction of a measure of financial protection
suffers from a lack of comparability of financial services, since
corporate finance comprises a variety of very heterogeneous prod-
ucts . The only solution to this is to split up the financial
sector into various industries and/or "products" (debt con-
tracts), as there are many different finance needs on the demand
side and many different actors on the supply side. A grouping of
products should be done along characteristics like term struc-
ture, type of interest rate (fixed or variable) and default risk
of the respective borrower.
This includes prudential regulation and supervision of finan-
cial institutions as well as legal procedures for the enforce-
ment of debt contracts.- 6 -
Data problems, however, do not allow for a high degree of dis-
aggregation, especially because information on interest rates for
different borrowers is not available. This may lead to a less
comprehensive analysis, either because the number of different
contracts has to be restricted or because only average costs of
finance for each industry can be estimated.
Finally, potential borrowers may face barriers-to-entry, on stock
markets or for long-term credit supply. This "non-price rati-
oning" cannot be captured by an indicator based on a pure com-
parison of prices on official markets, neglecting spill-over
effects to unregulated ("unofficial") credit markets.
The approach chosen in this paper circumvents some of the above
mentioned problems. Instead of measuring all distortions for
intermediate goods and for corporate finance in one composite
indicator a partial analysis of distortions in one type of finan-
cial markets will be applied, although this makes it more diffi-
cult to give a complete picture of the impact of industrial poli-
cy. The method used in this paper is based on an analysis of the
sectoral structure of credit allocation. Such an analysis may
reveal a pattern of discrimination among sectors that can be
attributed to government-induced distortions, even though the
latter are measured in terms of quantity effects rather than
price effects. This avoids the above mentioned problem of the
"pure interest rate"-concept as well as the difficult inter-
twining of the choice of the appropriate finance pattern with
investment and production related decisions.
In order to estimate the quantity effect of distortions, a hypo-
thetical undistorted and country specific structure of credit
allocation has to be derived for each of the respective countries
by using econometric methods. This can be done by deriving the
determinants of sectoral credit allocation in an undistorted
situation, as it will be done in the next section. Thereafter,
government-induced distortions will be measured as an additional
variable affecting the sectoral credit allocations. This avoids— 7 —
many of the problems caused by the "world market prices"-method.
To estimate the impact of economic and political parameters cor-
rectly one has to make sure, that the time series data cover both
periods with and without capital market regulations.
III. Determinants of the Corporate Capital Structure
The calculation of a hypothetical undistorted county-specific
pattern of corporate finance across different industries is based
on mainstream microeconomic theory, especially on the theory of
corporate finance .
According to the traditional theory of corporate finance the
following determinants of a corporation's demand for credit can
be derived:
c
1) investment opportunities in terms of expected profitability
and risk of future investments;
2) availability of internal finance, i.e. accumulated profits
from the past and future growth expectations in terms of cash
flow;
3) expected credit costs (or conditions for raising equity
respectively);
4) the volatility of interest rates and
5) financial "rules of thumb", relating term structure of debt
and investment period (or liquidity of assets respectively).
Since this approach assumes that decision on investment and
finance projects are made simultaneously, a given set of invest-
ment opportunities leads to the demand for total corporate
See for example Copeland/Weston (1983).- 8 -
finance means, depending on credit supply conditions. The firm's
demand for ,external finance can be obtained by subtracting in-
ternal funds available for financing these investment projects
from total financial needs. The actual volume of external finance
is derived by equalizing credit supply and demand for external
finance, i.e. where the marginal efficiency equals the interest
rate. In addition, the financial "rules of thumb" have to be
integrated in this decision making process, because both owners
of firms and banks have raised traditional beliefs concerning an
optimal balance sheet structure. These guidelines do also enter
credit conditionalities, enforced by banks or other creditors.
Together with the structure of relative prices (i.e. the costs of
different forms of finance), the "rules of thumb" determine the
corporate capital structure.
In addition to these mainstream arguments, the modern theory of
1 2
corporate finance provides as determinants :
6) distortions through the tax system (e.g. investment tax
credits, depreciation allowances etc.);
7) potential "costs of financial distress" and
8) "agency costs", including the costs of monitoring the actions
of managers and providing collaterals for credit suppliers.
In the seventies and eighties, many empirical studies supported
these theoretically derived relationships, although they differed
1 Cf. T.E. Copeland and J.F. Weston (1983), Ch. 13.
2
These determinants are closely related to the concrete terms of
the financial system, some of which may already be shaped by
political influences in the broad sense (i.e. tradition and
ideology, pressure groups as well as self-interested bureau-
crats and politicians).
3 For example R.R. Spies (1974); R. Schmidt (1976); R.A. Taggart
(1977), A Jalilvand and R.S. Harris (1984); J. Tybout and T.
Bark (1988); S. Titman and R. Wessels (1988) or D. van der
Wijst (1989).- 9 -
in terms of aggregation level (firms or industries), valuation
concepts (book value or market value of assets, corrections for
the impact of inflation) and complexity of the decision-making
process (endogeneity of investment decisions and production
technology). Most of these studies model a firm's or an indus-
try's decision as a partial adjustment path to financial targets
("optimal capital structure"). However, none of the mentioned
studies consider aspects of capital supply, which is equivalent
to the assumption of perfectly elastic supply of capital at the
given interest rate.
A more realistic analytical framework should consist of supply
and demand functions, differentiated for industry (index i) and
debt contracts (index j) . The framework shows some similarities
to common portfolio-models for financial markets. The main dif-
ference is that portfolio optimization takes place both on demand
and supply side ("two-sided portfolio approach"). The supply
functions equal
(1) CS^ = CSi:j (IR, VRL, AFSi, IS±f AS±, ER±, P^);
IR = (IR1, IR2, ...),
where the arguments denote (net) supply of new credit (CS), a
vector of interest rates for the different debt contracts (IR),
the volatility of returns in the i-th industry (VR), the average
firm size (AFS), the industry size (IS), the firm's asset struc-
ture (AS), the equity ratio (ER) and political influences in
2
favour of this industry (PI) . An undistorted structure of credit
allocation prevails when PI equals zero. Moreover, the demand
functions equal
One industry-index may be reserved for government finance and
some debt contracts-indices may be reserved for foreign bor-
rowing to differentiate for different currencies.
2
This may be extended to PI.., if one can assume, that political
influence differs across "'"industries and forms of debt con-
tracts .- 10 -
(2) CDi;j = CDij (IR, ERI±, ICK, GIF^ ISi)/
where the arguments denote (net) demand for new credit (CD) ex-
pected return on investment (ERI), investment opportunities (10),
generation of internal funds (GIF).
These functions are subject to the following restrictions:
(3) ECD. . = planned corporate investment (gross)
J ./. generation of internal funds (= corporate
saving)
which denotes the cumulated balance sheet identity of all firms
in the i-th industry
(4) ECSi;j
which is the condition for equilibrium in each market,
(5) S CS. . = household savings
1'-
1 ./. household investment (in real capital)
+ net foreign savings
which denotes the balance sheet identity of the sector of private
households, and
(6) adding up-restrictions on partial derivatives.
Still there are some possible improvements:
a) especially in developing countries there should be undertaken
a correction for effects of inflation on balance sheet items .
b) volume of savings and/or investment may be treated endogenous.
1 Cf. J. Tybout and T. Bark (1988); J. Tybout (1984).- 11 -
c) aspects of stock-flow-dynamics may be incorporated (for ex-
ample the impact of actual investment on generation of in-
ternal funds in future periods).
d) impacts through the tax system may be incorporated.
IV. Preliminary Evidence for Brazil and Peru
1. Specification of Hypo-theses
In order to yield a testable model, the comprehensive model of
financial flows in the corporate sector, as it was presented in
the previous section has to be reduced to a single equation.
There are several reasons for that. First, the lack of data,
especially industry-specific interest rates for different forms
of debt, does not allow the modelling of the total finance pro-
cess. Second, long-term credit in many developing countries can
be considered to be a limiting factor for investment decisions,
that can hardly be substituted by other types of finance. There-
fore, the analysis concentrates on the cross-sector allocation of
long-term bank credit (LBC), as it is featured in the following
equation.
LBC. = f (IR., GIF±, AS±, IS^ PI^ •
The share of an industry in total net disbursement of long-term
bank credits depends on the value of five variables. The expected
signs of the influence of the variables are denoted under the
abbreviations in the formula above.
For estimation purposes, the equation has been transformed to:
LBC.
r-rr- = a + a • IR. + a • GIF. + ag • AS. + a. • IS. + a_ • PI. LBC o 1 1 2 13 l 4 i5 l total
LBC is defined as net volume of new provided long-term bank
credits of the i-th industry and of the total manufacturing sec-- 12 -
tor, respectively. Foreign credits, exchange rate effects and
restrictions, for capital transfer have been omitted. Due to a
lack of data, no correction for inflation effects on balance
sheet items, interest rates and investment returns has been per-
formed. Short time series did not allow the calculation of reli-
able figures for the variability of returns. Therefore, no vari-
able measuring business risk is included in the test equation.
IR denotes the average interest rate on both long-term and short-
term bank credits, which was estimated for each industry by
dividing interest expenses through total credit outstanding
(average of beginning-of-period and end of period values) . The
credit share is expected to be higher, the lower the value of IR.
Multicollinearity problems may arise from the inclusion of the
interest rate into the list of variables, because political in-
fluence probably affects the volume of credit and the level of
interest rates. Therefore, separate estimations have been made,
where IR has been excluded from the list of variables.
GIF denotes the return on equity in the previous period, which
serves as a proxy for generation of internal funds. The credit
share of an industry is the lower, the higher the accumulation of
funds has been, i.e. the higher GIF. It was calculated by
dividing corporate after-tax income through total book value of
equity. One could think of corrections for average dividend pay-
ments or for generation of "silent reserves", but sample data did
not allow for that.
AS denotes the value of fixed assets net of depreciation in per
cent of total assets, which serves as an indicator for the long-
term finance requirements in the respective industry. The credit
share of an industry is the higher, the higher the value of AS.
On the firm level, this variable could be also interpreted in a
different way, since it allows for identifying the credit capa-
city in terms of collateral value. However, this is less plau-
Spill-over effects due to credit rationing are to some extent
captured by this method.Bib!tofh®k
- 13 - ^esfnstihrfsfurWeffwirtschaft
sible on aggregated industries level. In addition, the use of
balance sheet data may result in overestimations of the credit
capacity in case of asset overvaluation (e.g. due to low capacity
utilization).
IS denotes the share of the industry in value added of the manu-
facturing sector, which is a measure of industry size. The credit
share of an industry is the higher, the higher the value of IS.
Gross sales share has been considered as an alternative measure.
In any case, simultaneity problems may arise, because it cannot
be ruled out, that certain industries have grown because of
above-average credit allocation.
PI denotes the difference between the effective rate of protec-
tion of the respective industry and the average effective rate of
protection as an indirect measure for political influence in
favour of this industry. This method has been chosen instead of
working with proxies for the preferences and the strength of
influence of a number of pressure groups , because it needs only
one variable. Hence the (hypothetical) undistorted reference
situation can be obtained by setting the effective rate of pro-
tection equal to the average rate of protection across the indus-
tries in the sample (PI. = 0), assumed that the time series data
cover both distorted and undistorted periods.
The sign of the partial derivative with respect to PI is a priori
unclear, because the structure of distortions in trade and in
credit markets may be in the same direction ("parallel", positive
sign) or in the opposite direction ("antiparallel", negative
sign) or without any parallels (sign not significant). In the
first case, the more (less) influential pressure groups in trade
policy are also the more (less) influential in financial market
regulations, which leads to this "parallel" outcome. This outcome
indicates that financial regulation and import protection cannot
be treated as separate political markets. This is especially the
This method is due to G.S. Becker (1983).- 14 -
case, when the institutional framework for political decision-
making is the same for both forms of protection. Due to their
political power interest groups can benefit from both forms of
protection without concentrating their rent-seeking activities on
only one form of protection. In addition, those sectors which are
highly protected may favour financial protection, since trade
protection becomes redundant once it exceeds the level of pro-
hibitive protection. In the second case, pressure groups are
successful only in influencing one policy decision, whereas they
incur losses in the other area. This antiparallel result is very
likely when government decisions on protection are subject to
rent-seeking activities on two different political markets. These
markets can be separated in the sense that there is a different
set of economic agents, i.e. ministries, government institutions,
firms, banks etc., so that rent seekers have to specialize on one
political market. Anti-parallel outcomes are especially likely in
the secondary stage of import substitution, in which the effec-
tive protection given to final producers is exceedingly eroded by
growing protection given to producers of intermediate and capital
goods. If trade protection for final good producers is prohibi-
tive, their declining effective protection can be compensated by
growing financial protection, which may lead to an anti-parallel
outcome.
2. Data Base
Almost every empirical analysis of capital structure - even for
industrialized countries - has to rely on sample data. This
creates new problems, because small firms are underrepresented
and - in case of large conglomerates or transnational corpora-
tions - problems with the grouping in industries arise.
In the case of Brazil data were taken from the annual sample of
1.000 corporations (IBRE) based on balance sheet data; the period
1 See Amelung, Sell (1989)- 15 -
covers the years 1981-85. Aggregation level is very high: in the
manufacturing sector only 10 sectors are identified, one of which
was separated, because the sample size is too small. The sampled
corporations cover roughly 30% of total sales in the manu-
facturing sector. Estimates for the effective rate of protection
in 1985 are taken from Kume (1988), whose calculations were based
on price comparisons ("implicit rate").
In the case of Peru data were taken from an irregularly under-
taken sample of about 1.000-1.300 corporations (CONASEV), based
on balance sheet data for 1985 and 1986. Though the level of
disaggregation is very high (ISIC 4-digits), the sample size had
to be reduced because of the lack of respective data on effective
protection. The latter were taken from Hanel (1988) and were
calculated for 1985 and 1986 by including protection resulting
from tariffs and subsidies.
Estimations with (net) changes of credit volume were not possible
in the case of Peru due to different sample sizes for every year;
therefore amount of credits outstanding was chosen as the de-
pendent variable, scaled by the number of firms in the respective
industry (N.; in hundreds).
3. Empirical Results
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 1 (Brazil) and
in Table 2 (Peru).
In the case of Brazil, all coefficients show the expected signs
and are significant except the interest rate variable. The
estimated coefficient of the protection indicator (PI) is stable
in size and significant and shows a positive sign; this supports
the hypothesis of "parallel" influence in trade policy and finan-
cial markets distortions.
Gross sales shares have been tested as an industry size variable
(instead of value added share); the results were almost unchanged- 16 -
Table 1 - Parallel distortions in trade policy and financial mar-
kets in Brazil (1980-85)
Dep. var. Const. IR GIF AS IS PI adj.R*
LBC
i -30.67*** - -0.378 0.873*** 1.579*** 0.081*** 71.0
T Rf
total (-4.820) (-1.522) (4.820) (4.181) (2.741)
__ •• __ -12.50 -0.095 -0.654** 0.620** 1.484*** 0.096*** 72.0
(-1.293) (-1.533) (-2.155) (2.553) (3.942) (3.125)
MV












.8 SD = 17.85 37.8 6.92 10.8 4.95 55.1
s. be
t-values in parentheses. - MV = mean value. - SD = standard
deviation. - * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5
percent level. *** significant at the 1 per cent level.
with respect to size and significance of estimated coefficients.
Average firm size (value added per firm or gross sales per firm)
has not been added to the list of variables, since it was not
significant.
As in the case of Brazil, estimations for the case of Peru show
the expected signs and are significant (except for the interest
rate).
The estimated coefficient of the protection indicator (PI) is
stable in size and significant, but shows a negative sign; this
supports the hypotheses of "compensatory" influences in trade
policy and financial market distortions.
There are obviously a number of critical points in the applied
method, some of which have already been mentioned above. In addi-
tion, the statistical method applied (ordinary least squares) may
raise some doubts concerning the estimation results. First, it
has not been tested for heteroskedasticity within the "cross-
sector-dimension" of these pooled cross section time series anal-
ysis, because time series were too small. Second, some variables
are probably not normally distributed, in which case the signifi-
cance-criteria do not work.- 17 -
Table 2 - Compensatory distortions in trade policy and financial
markets in Peru (1985/86)









-6.962 -12.64 -0.180** 0.451*** 2.729** -0.055* 51.0







- * significant at the 10
level. *** significant at
9 4.0
2 28.6
. - MV - mean
percent level,







value. - SD = standard






V. Summary and Conclusions
The reduction and lifting of trade barriers comprises only one
part of an economic liberalization program. In many countries
regulations in the foreign trade regime are accompanied by
regulations of the financial sector, which may also benefit par-
ticular economic sectors. The structure of distortions in the
capital markets in a country may be in the same ("parallel dis-
tortions") or in the opposite direction ("compensatory distorti-
ons") as the distortions through trade policy, or without any
observable parallels. In order to analyse these possible causali-
ties empirically, this paper develops a method to measure the
degree of protection in financial markets. The first section
discusses some of the methodological problems of analysing dis-
tortions in financial markets. Although an extension of the con-
cept of effective protection seems to be the more satisfactory
method to measure the degree of protection on financial markets,
there remain a number of conceptual problems to be solved.- 18 -
For this reason, another approach had to be chosen. Finance
decisions can be simulated under (hypothetical) undistorted fi-
nancial market conditions; the differences to the observed capi-
tal structure may then be interpreted as influenced by govern-
mental regulation. This method provides a country specific, endo-
genous reference situation and avoids the problems of "world
market"-reference. The most important restrictions in this
methods are the omission of foreign credits, the one-equation-
approach neglecting supply side arguments and lack of proxies for
some unobservable determinants of credit demand (e.g. investment
risk).
Empirical analysis on industry-level has been undertaken for the
case of long-term bank credit supply in Brazil and Peru. Although
the results should be interpreted carefully, especially because
the time series cover only periods with a high level of financial
regulation, they lend some preliminary support to the hypotheses,
that there is parallel influence on trade policy and financial
market distortions in Brazil and antiparallel (compensatory)
influence in Peru.
This would lead to the conclusion, that simultaneous implementa-
tion of trade liberalization and financial deregulation should be
politically more sustainable in Peru than it is the case in
Brazil. The losses of income in those industries previously
gaining from high effective protection can be neutralized on the
political level, if the distortions in the financial sector are
removed in the same moment, which hits other industries. In Bra-
zil, there is no chance for such a political neutralization,
because the removal of trade restrictions hits just the same
group of industries as the drawing back of preferential condi-
tions for corporate finance; in that case, the government has to
accept a negative trade-off between fostering the adjustment
process and maintaining the structure of income distribution,
which needs a (political) compromise.- 19 -
A more careful analysis should consider the whole process of cor-
porate finance and investment (as it has been sketched in the
third section), although data shortcoming will remain a serious
problem. In a parallel attempt, one should try to develop
possible solutions for an extended protection indicator.
Finally, the degree of political influence on capital market
regulation should be analysed in more specific forms (i.e. by
identifying pressure groups and their strength). The recommenda-
tions for the "timing and sequencing" of structural adjustment
programs could then be based on more detailed arguments con-
cerning income distribution-effects and political opposition to
be expected.- 20 -
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